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Abstract:
The common law engages with social media in a manner that overlaps with defamation:
seeking to balance the competing interests of free speech and protection of reputation.
Employment law prompts a question as to how the law on this topic is developing.
Adjudication of the concept of business reputation is the comparative focal point. Canadian
employment law is developing a balance between protecting business reputation and
workers’ free speech (though there are issues arising therein). In the UK, however, the term
has been more of a blunt tool. As a result, a juxtaposition has arisen: speech in traditional
media is better protected than that of workers using virtual social platforms. Using the
contrasting case law as an example, the argument pursued here is that law must develop in
a manner that establishes scope for remarks by workers on user-generated content
platforms while protecting business reputation. To permit discipline for any form of social
media remark would be inconsistent with the spirit of twenty-first century defamation law
that has expanded protection for speech.
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I. Introduction
Two intersecting points of departure ground the present study. First, employment law
provides an enhanced setting from which to observe the balancing of competing interests
arising in the law’s interaction with social media.1 Second, social media challenges the legal
understanding of free speech. By its boundless form, social media naturally brings about
comparisons amongst different locales. The jurisdictions under study here are English and
Canadian labour/employment litigation where social media use has been the basis for
discipline up to and including dismissal.2 These two jurisdictions have been selected for the
reason that they offer contrasting adjudication of the same issue (worker discipline for social
media use) set against the background of harm to business reputation. There is also an
instructive gap in treatment of this issue between these two countries precipitated by the
development of online user-generated content: the extent to which speech is associated with
the workplace. Discipline for speech on social media hints at a categorization of work where
certain positions (such as academic) inherently provide a wider scope for protection of free
speech while other jobs (noted in the employment decisions below) perceive of a restricted
space for free expression. The focus in this paper remains on challenging the latter grouping.
The concept of business reputation is at the core of this examination; a phrase used to justify
discipline based on expression via social media.3 A divergence of opinion arises within the
parameters of this term based on jurisdiction. Canada protects business reputation with space
for workers’ free speech. In comparison, the UK has not developed much nuance and an
1

Professor Oliphant illustrated the influence of the workplace in legal developments, namely tort law, in K.
Oliphant, “Tort Law, Risk, and Technological Innovation in England” (2014), 59 McGill Law Journal 819-845.
2
The public law considerations will not be discussed here. There are relevant statutes in this area such as in the
UK s.127(1)(a) of the Communications Act 2003 which makes it an offence to send a message using a public
electronic communications network if that message is “grossly offensive or of an indecent, obscene or menacing
character”. On this provision see, D. McGoldrick, “The Limits of Freedom of Expression on Facebook and
Social Networking Sites: A UK Perspective” (2013) 13 Human Rights Law Review 125-151. On public order
considerations see J. Rowbottom, “To Rant, Vent and Converse: Protecting Low Level Digital Speech” (2012)
71 Cambridge Law Journal 355-383; J. Rowbottom, “In the shadow of the big media: freedom of expression,
participation and the production of knowledge online” (2014) Public Law 491-511 [Rowbottom (2014)].
3
The Ontario Court of Appeal’s decision in Barrick Gold Corp v Lopehandia (2004), 71 O.R. (3d) 416, [44],
speaks to the landmark change in defamation where the internet is the vehicle: the “distinctive capacity of the
Internet to cause instantaneous and irreparable damage to the business reputation of an individual or corporation
by reason of its interactive and globally all-pervasive nature and the characteristics of Internet communications”.
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unsavoury juxtaposition has resulted: speech in the mainstream media is better protected than
that of workers on social media. Using the UK as an example of a more restrictive legal
treatment, the situation is cause for pointed consideration, especially given the underlying
ethos of defamation law reforms (in the jurisdiction) to expand protection for a wider range
of speech.4 A worker who raises an issue regarding her workplace or the products made
(services provided) by her employer should be afforded some opportunity to comment 5 and
not automatically be subjected to discipline, let alone termination. There is scope for more
engaged discussion. Just as in defamation law, there are limitations, but there also should be a
prima facie right to render critical opinions on social media subject to those limitations, even
in the workplace setting. Workers’ speech on social media is subject to the legitimate and yet
seemingly expanding interpretation of business interests. A basic right to free expression
should be adapted to social media in the employment setting and this basic right should not
be restricted by jurisdiction.
This analysis begins by exploring the distinction between libel and slander, concluding that
social media (as a written form of conversation) converts slander into libel. The intersection
between employment law and social media is then unpacked. An examination of relevant
English cases reveals a strictly construed concept of business reputation resulting in a low
threshold for the discipline (if not dismissal) of workers expressing their opinions on social
media platforms. Contributing to this situation are expansive contract clauses granting
employers a far-reaching power to discipline or dismiss workers as result of online
comments. The chilling effect on speech is evident; contrasting unfavourably with the tenor
of the Defamation Act 2013 and the associated effort to protect a wider spectrum of speech.
In comparison, Canadian employment decisions demonstrate greater nuance in adjudicating
this same matter; thereby underlining scope for a more balanced approach. While Canadian
cases are more nuanced, there remain developing issues within this body of law which will be
canvassed. Overall, the aim in the present work is to outline how law may accommodate
speech and business interests in the employment setting.
II. From slander to libel: the conversion of speech in social media
Defamation has long made the distinction between spoken and written speech. Once the
common law courts took jurisdiction over defamation law (from the Star Chamber), the view
emerged that the written form was of a more severe nature. In King v Lake6 Hale C.B. ruled
that the written form “contains more malice than if they had been once spoken”.7 The
decision of Chief Justice Mansfield in Thorley v Lord Kerry8 marked a useful point of change
in the courts’ attitude towards written and spoken forms of defamation.9 Identifying the
precedent “established by some of the greatest names known to the law, Lord Hardwicke,

4

As set out in the Defamation Act 2013 and the common law developments leading up to its passage.
The remark of Sedley LJ equally applies to both the workplace and the public space, “Freedom only to speak
inoffensively is not worth having”: Redmond-Bates v DPP (1999) 163 JP 789.
6
(1668) Hardr. 470. Kaye has criticized taking this meaning from King: J.M. Kaye “Libel and Slander – Two
Torts or One?” (1975) 91 Law Quarterly Review 524-539, 531. Others have not adopted this line of argument.
See for example L. McNamara, Reputation and Defamation (Oxford: OUP, 2007) who does not make reference
to Kaye.
7
The decision in Austin v Culpepper (1683) 2 Show. K.B. 313 has been included in some literature as asserting
a similar point. There, the defendant had forged an order of the Chancery Court stating that Sir John Austin
should “stand committed”. Culpepper’s conduct however should distinguish this decision.
8
(1812) 4 Taunt. 355 [Thorley].
9
J.M. Kaye “Libel and Slander – Two Torts or One?” (1975) 91 Law Quarterly Review 524-539; L. McNamara,
Reputation and Defamation (Oxford: OUP, 2007), 91 ff.
5
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Hale, … Holt C.J.”, though contrary to his personal view,10 Mansfield C.J. concluded “an
action for a libel may be brought on words written, when the words, if spoken would not
sustain it.”11 The distinction owes to arguments such as “written scandal is more generally
diffused than words spoken”.12 Although the permanence of form allowed comments to be
read by a wider audience, Mansfield C.J. went on to suggest that making a remark in a public
place (such as the Royal Exchange in London) “may be much more extensively diffused than
a few printed papers dispersed”.13 These decisions suggest concern with media that may
reach the most widespread audience. Today, the spoken word, however, reaches a smaller
audience (even if shouted in the Royal Exchange) than social media (which itself transcends
boundaries of many forms). And so, there are two foundations taken from the history of the
law of defamation for application today. First, libel is more serious than slander because it
may be disseminated to a larger audience. Second, the medium that reaches a more vast
audience is of greater concern to the courts. Following these points draws attention to a
significant (as well as historically important) conclusion: social media converts slander to
libel insofar as the medium is considered to be the equivalent of having a conversation. Put
more generally, social media makes speech actionable owing to the historical distinction
between slander and libel.14
Prior to social media, workers would voice their objections at a social gathering, perhaps the
end of the workday or at a break. Remarks, which at one time may have been made in person,
are now additionally “posted” to a worker’s social media page and have formed grounds for
termination (for example by “making disrespectful, damaging and derogatory comments”).15
The belief that social media is “only” another medium for oral discussion remains ubiquitous.
In Pridgen v University of Calgary16 one of the plaintiffs offered the following understanding
of Facebook: “it’s a social networking site, things that are said on here are not designed to be
held up to intense scrutiny, it is merely the equivalent of having an online conversation. It is
as public as … standing in the middle of the University … hallway and saying the exact same
thing.”17 Focusing solely on the argument that social media is the equivalent of standing in a
hallway and making a statement,18 this understanding of the medium does not fit with longheld distinctions in the law regarding liberties attached to speech.19 The appeal of social
media platforms such as Facebook has also pushed its way into workplace adjudication:
it mimics traditional social interactions. The ability to include or exclude those who can share in
the conversation is important. Many subscribers, in particular younger persons, regard Facebook
10

“If the matter were for the first time to be decided at this day, I should have no hesitation in saying, that no
action could be maintained for written scandal which could not be maintained for the words if they had been
spoken”: Thorley, 366.
11
Ibid, 365.
12
Ibid.
13
Ibid.
14
An associated idea is found in the law of evidence and the developments around hearsay. Historically there
was an aversion, but more recently the scope for the acceptance of such evidence has expanded. A full
elaboration of this point is beyond the scope of the present work. There has been a movement to assess hearsay
as a matter of weight instead of excluding it prima facie. On this matter see the examples: in the UK the Civil
Evidence Act 1995, c.38 and in Canada the common law developments outlined in S.N. Lederman, A.W. Bryant
& M.K. Fuerst, Sopinka, Lederman & Bryant The Law of Evidence 4th ed. (Markham: Lexis Nexis, 2014).
15
Lougheed Imports Ltd v UFCW, Local 1518 (2010) CLRBR (2d) 186, [56].
16
2012 ABCA 139 [Pridgen].
17
Ibid, [32].
18
The plaintiff also expressed his view of how social media is used: “I hesitate to believe that future employers
will go to Facebook sites looking for statements made by first year students and take them with any degree of
seriousness”: Pridgen, [32].
19
The argument that Twitter comments are akin to a private conversation was expressly rejected in Professional
Firefighters Association, Local 3888 v Grievance (Edwards), 2014 CanLII 62879, [178].
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as conduct engaged in on personal time, unconnected to the workplace, analogous to sharing a
beer with colleagues and friends or getting together with friends to confide details about their
jobs.20

So novel is the perception of the medium that terminated workers have contended: “How
could I have assumed that a release on a Facebook page would be grounds for dismissal?”21
Disconnect22 between users’ perceptions of the place of the medium and legal distinctions23
adds to this complicated topic and also confirms the impact of the distinction between slander
and libel24 where, for the most part, the latter has been actionable per se.25 A published
remark carries the significant potential of lowering the plaintiff amongst right-thinking
members of society26 because it is indeterminately accessible: the opinion of anyone who
sees the remarks may be influenced. What may be a trivial difference to the layperson is in
fact a significant distinction within the law.
The permanent form of social media comments arguably places the individual at home in a
similar position to a publisher defendant in the common defamation cases; for this form of
communication must be viewed as something beyond what was previously contemplated with
regards to this tort.27 As noted by the European Court of Human Rights, the internet,
particularly social media as a form of communication via the internet, “has now become one
of the principal means by which individuals exercise their right to freedom of expression and
information, providing as it does essential tools for participation in activities and discussions
concerning political issues and issues of general interest.”28 The decision in Lougheed
Imports Ltd (cob West Coast Mazda) v United Food and Commercial Workers International
Union29 illustrates. Two union activists who had been part of a union certification campaign
at Lougheed were terminated after a successful certification vote. The union argued that this
was anti-union animus. Lougheed contended that there was just cause30 for these dismissals
20

Groves v Cargojet Holdings Ltd. [2011] C.L.A.D. 257 [Cargojet], [77]. Similarly, the grievor in Toronto
Professional Firefighters Association, Local 3888 v Grievance (Edwards), 2014 CanLII 62879, [67], was
quoted as contending that Twitter was a locale for random thoughts to be expressed and that these expressions
were not taken seriously.
21
Cargojet, [77].
22
Voorhoof and Humblet have called this a “virtual conflict zone”: D. Voorhoof & P. Humblet, in “The Right to
Freedom of Expression in the Workplace under Article 10 ECHR” in F. Dorssemont, K. Lorcher & I.
Schomann, The European Convention on Human Right and the Employment Relationship (Oxford: Hart, 2013),
237-286, 238.
23
The employer’s successful argument in Canada Post Corp v CUPW, (2012), 216 LAC (4th) 207 [83], is of
note in this instance: “The Employer suggested that there is a fundamental difference between ‘bar talk’ and
social media: social media is accessible for months or years; it has a huge potential audience; the contents are
discoverable through key word searches, and the contents are easily copied and forwarded to others.”
24
Under the Defamation Act 1952, s.16(1) words shall be construed as including a reference to pictures, visual
images, gestures and other methods of signifying meaning”; the Cable and Broadcasting Act 1984, s.28 extends
a statement in s.16(1) of the Defamation Act 1952 to cable programme services; the Theatres Act 1968, s.4(1)
states: “the publication of words in the course of a performance of a play shall . . . be treated as publication in
permanent form.”
25
In Canada and the UK, libel has been actionable per se but it is contended that with s.1 of the UK Defamation
Act 2013 (a claim must meet a threshold of seriousness) this is no longer the case. And so, what is characterized
as converting libel into slander is to say that social media, as an online conversation, is a transcript of a
conversation and as such places the ‘speakers’ in a more actionable position.
26
Sim v Stretch [1936] 2 All E.R. 1237 (H.L.). Sim is a decision which remains of contemporary importance:
Thornton v Telegraph Media Group Ltd. [2010] EWHC 1414 (Q.B.).
27
The Australian High Court in Dow Jones v Gutnick (2002) 210 CLR 575, [64] described the internet as “not
simply an extension of past communications technology”.
28
Yildirim v Turkey [2012] ECHR 2074, [56].
29
(2010) 186 CLRBR (2d) 82 [Lougheed].
30
In Canada the test for just cause is found in William Scott & Company Ltd v Canadian Food and Allied
Workers Union, Local P-162 [1977] 1 Can LRBR 1: (1) the seriousness of the employee’s offence; (2) whether
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based on the Facebook posts of the workers.31 The Labour Board found that the dismissal
was just because the aim of the comments was to denigrate supervisors and managers. 32 Of
particular importance was the rejection of the union’s claim that Facebook comments were
akin to inappropriate verbal statements one would hear on a shop floor regularly and should
therefore not be treated as anything more than “shop floor” banter.33 An important factor for
the Board, the remarks gained greater force because of the medium (which together reached
almost 500 individuals). The platform here took the situation past “‘moaning’ or ‘griping’” to
a more serious level where harm to the employers’ business interests was found.34
A similar tension to that found in defamation maps onto social media in employment law;
that is, (commercial) reputation interests versus freedom of expression.35 The following
example sets up the more detailed discussion below. The Canadian province of Alberta’s
Public Sector Services Continuation Act 201336 defined the novel term “strike threat”. The
preamble stated the statute’s purpose: to deal with public services “of the utmost importance”
to the people and functioning of the jurisdiction where “any withdrawal or threatened
withdrawal of those services would be contrary to the public interest and could compromise
health or safety of, or otherwise cause hardship” to the province. “Strike threat” included “an
act or threat to act that could reasonably be perceived as preparation for an employees’
strike”. If an employer believed a strike threat was occurring, the Act permitted an
application to the provincial labour board for a declaration that a strike threat was
occurring.37 If a strike threat was found to be occurring, the Board would issue a directive
requiring the workers, trade union and its executive to cease the impugned conduct.38
Moreover, where a strike threat declaration has been made,39 the directive may also bar “any
future strike threat made for substantially the same reasons in respect of the employees in the
bargaining unit”.40 The available penalties to the union are remarkably thorough: the
employer may suspend deduction and remittance of union dues; 41 this suspension “must
continue for a period of 3 months for the first day or partial day on which the strike threat …
occurs plus one additional month for each additional day or partial day on which the strike
threat … continues”;42 the Board may make an “abatement order” amounting to “$1 000 000
for each day or partial day on which a strike threat … occurs or continues”;43 the employer
may recover “eligible losses” in addition to these penalties44 as well as other remedies of
the employee’s conduct was premeditated, repetitive or provoked; (3) the length of the employee’s record of
service; (4) whether the employer engaged in progressive forms of discipline prior to dismissal; and (5) whether
the employee’s dismissal is in line with the employer’s policies and past record.
31
The impugned comments were - “my Boss … [is] A COMPLETE JACK-ASS not just Half-a Tard” and “[the
employer] is a f[…] joke…don’t spend your money there as they are f[…] crooks and are out to hose you”:
Lougheed, [35], [37].
32
Ibid, [98].
33
Ibid, [97]-[98].
34
Ibid, [97].
35
Freedom of expression rights have been found in both the public and private sector employment settings:
Heinisch v Germany [2011] IRLR 923 (ECtHR), [46]; Fuentes Bobo v Spain (2001) 31 EHRR 50 (ECtHR),
[38].
36
c.P-41.5 [PSSCA], s.1(k). Assent December 11, 2013.
37
Section 5.
38
Section 5(4).
39
Within twenty-four hours of the application pursuant to s.5(3)(b).
40
Section 6(b).
41
Section 6(1)(a),(b).
42
Section 6(2).
43
Section 9(9). The amount is due within seven days if the strike threat ends before the abatement order is made
or if it continues, it is payable the day after the order is made.
44
Section 11.
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“monetary compensation for losses resulting from a strike threat …, not later than 2 years
after the day on which the strike threat … ends”.45 There was no potential for the union and
employer to enter into an agreement for compensation relating to any of these penalties as it
was expressly barred by the PSSCA.46
The Alberta Government may not have intended to include social media within the ambit of
this legislation. Nevertheless, the likelihood of capture remains strong. If a trade union was
found to be communicating with members, potential members or even making a statement to
the public via social media (as one viable medium) to put forward a case for possible
industrial action, the conduct is likely to fall under the spectrum of a “strike threat” and
therefore would be subject to the aforementioned repercussions. This would include a
discussion for the “setting of a vote or other poll of employees to determine whether they
wish to strike”.47 The completeness of this legislation makes it the definition of chilling
insofar as the effect it would have on discussion amongst the union, its members and the
public via social media. As such it is a useful illustration of the argument advanced here:
there is a perceptible disconnect between freedom of expression under civil law as compared
with the workplace setting.
III. The intersection between social media and employment
Social media offers peril and opportunity for employing entities. Different groupings of
social media considerations for online comments posted by a worker may be discerned: 48 use
of an electronic communication device provided by the employer; use of the employer’s
network (including for personal reasons); remarks made about work-related materials where
an employee uses his/her own electronic device (or that of a non-co-worker);49 finally
comments by a worker on his/her own electronic device or that of a non-co-worker where the
subject matter may be considered offensive in some manner (even if unconnected to the
workplace). Some employers may hesitate in adopting an off-duty and on-duty applicable
policy.50 The dominant view of employers regarding social media is likely that of its business
utility for public outreach. Many companies now have Facebook pages where they “want
people (including employees) visiting the company’s Facebook page and expressing positive
sentiments about working for us and about our products.”51 The business utility of social
media is not explored here but it remains an important mitigating factor in this discussion:
some instances illustrate the desire is to use social media for the enterprise’s own purposes
while punishing for “social” use which does not conform. As will be seen below, contract

45

Section 12(1), (2).
Section 8.
47
Section 1(k)
48
The growth of mobile internet access (as noted in K. Perset, “The Economic and Social Role of Internet
Intermediaries”, OECD Digital Economy Papers, No. 171, OECD Publishing) suggests the continuation of
nebulous issues surrounding user-generated content and the workplace.
49
Of note for multinational employers, in creating a policy, the US National Labor Relations Act 29 USC ∫ 151
(1935) [NLRA] may be a factor as it protects speech about working conditions; a matter discussed further below.
50
For example, “In light of our policy direction being that employees should not be using social media tools to
communicate for business purposes, it felt wrong to provide guidance on how one should optimize their use for
business purposes”: M. Crestohl, “Developing a Social Media Policy: TD Bank Group’s Experience” in The
Law Society of Upper Canada Special Lectures 2012: Employment Law and the New Workplace in the Social
Media Age (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2013), 195-202, 198.
51
J. O’Reilly, “Reflections on the Development of a Social Media Policy: Loblaws” in The Law Society of
Upper Canada Special Lectures 2012: Employment Law and the New Workplace in the Social Media Age
(Toronto: Irwin Law, 2013), 203-205, 204.
46
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clauses remain exceptionally useful tools for protecting businesses from their workers’ social
media usage.52
Social media has been adjudicated using tests which pre-date the medium. Although this is an
unsurprising point, given the common law system, it does highlight a gap in consideration of
the challenges arising from the innovation of the virtual social platform. Within this gap sits
troubles, one of which is explored here. Treatment of social media speech by workers53
stands at a distance behind the more robust engagement that reforms in defamation law
(common law and statute) have encouraged. This characterisation applies most particularly to
the UK.
In this section, engagement of the topic is as follows. First, an example of the common law
applying to social media will be used to demonstrate how “old law” may be adapted to a new
setting. Second, UK employment cases where termination of a worker based on social media
comments is the issue will be discussed. These decisions will be contrasted with those in
Canada in each subsection. The theme introduced below and explored in each of the ensuing
subsections is that the worker’s impugned comments on social media are generically assessed
based on the presumption of a negative impact on the business reputation of the employing
entity.
(i) Adapting the common law to social media
While the subject matter is new, common law principles can still be applied. One example is
the decision in Byrne v. Deane54 where illegal machines were removed from a club following
a tip to police. On the wall where the games had formerly been, someone had written: “But
he who gave the game away may he byrnn in hell and rue the day.” Byrne, taking this to be a
reference to himself, sued in defamation. The court rejected the claim, finding that being
called a good subject of the King does not ground a claim in defamation. An analogy has
been drawn from this decision. The club owned the wall on which the message had been
written by another individual which, allegedly, defamed the plaintiff. The structure is similar
to issues that arise in social media where there is an author of a comment on a virtual wall for
an unlimited audience to see. In Byrne, the owner of the wall was sued because he had
control over that space (he had let the writing remain on the wall, despite protestation to the
contrary). The actual writers were not known and were not sued. Today, a similar scenario
has arisen where anonymous comments or posts by those employing pseudonyms are the
subject matter of a defamation claim.55 In lieu, those who have control over that space are
sued instead. It is an important reminder that despite the law being said to lag behind

52

The view asserted here is that the potential for an employer to dismiss (coupled with case law vindicating this
power) has a deterrent effect on other workers in their social media habits regarding work.
53
Vickers has identified different forms of speech in the workplace: whistleblowing, political speech, principled
dissent and general comment. She has argued at length that “some form of employment protection is required
for employees who suffer work based sanctions for the exercise of their freedom of speech. Protection may be
needed at work, regardless of whether the speech itself took place at work”: L. Vickers, Freedom of Speech and
Employment (Oxford: OUP, 2002), 237, 15.
54
[1937] 1 KB 818 [Byrne]. This decision has given rise to further discussion – on which see Oriental Press
Group Ltd v Fevaworks Solutions Ltd. [2013] HKFCA 47 (where the court criticized Byrne) as well as A. Mullis
& R. Parkes QC (eds) Gatley on Libel and Slander 12th edn (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2013), 6.26.
55
To some extent the matter is addressed in the UK’s Defamation Act 2013, s.5 as well as the European Union’s
Electronic Commerce Directive Dir. 2000/31/EC brought into force in the UK in Electronic Commerce (EC
Directive) Regulations 2002 SI 2002/2013. This topic is explored further in A. Vamialis, “Online defamation:
confronting anonymity” (2013) 21 International Journal of Law and Information Technology 31-65.
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technological advances, the common law system is not without its own multipurpose tools.
Byrne is an example of the flexibility the common law system possesses.
What is flexibility in one instance can be rigidity in another. English law has long held a
corrective view of worker conduct insofar as it may taint an employer’s business. A
precedent is the Court of Appeal’s decision in Pearce v Foster56 where the court upheld
Pearce’s dismissal. Pearce was hired under a ten-year contract of employment (containing no
dismissal provisions) as principal clerk to conduct foreign correspondence for the defendant
merchant firm. He was also consulted as to which securities to purchase but was not involved
in financial aspects of the firm’s business. It was later established that he had speculated on
the stock exchange with vast sums of money (though not the firms’ or clients’ money). The
dismissal was upheld because the conduct was “wholly incompatible with the due and
faithful performance of his duties”.57 Elaborating on the rationale for upholding the dismissal,
Lindley LJ wrote: “the plaintiff having habitually conducted himself in such a manner as
would injure the business of his employers if his conduct were known, they might dismiss
him upon discovery of such conduct. It is not necessary for them to prove that they have in
fact suffered by reason of his conduct.”58 The potential for harm was sufficient. The
defendants were not required to adduce evidence of actual harm. For this reason, Pearce is
authority for the proposition that a worker cannot put her interests ahead of her employer’s.
The scope for protecting business interests is wide and the need to prove harm has rarely been
sought out by triers of fact.
Social media issues in employment law compel consideration of the law in its complex yet
engaging interconnectedness. Employers have well-founded concerns about reputational
harm arising from negative comments by employees about the workplace. And yet, should
employees not be free to speak their minds and enjoy the protection of the defences in the tort
of defamation (particularly the renovated law in England)? The punishment of dismissal is an
extreme response59 to such a nuanced challenge. The juxtaposition of commercial and free
speech is the focus of the ensuing discussion amongst the aforementioned jurisdictions.
(ii) Workers, social media and the UK
There is not an extensive body of reported decisions on the topic of social media and
employment in the UK. Even fewer move beyond the employment tribunal stage. One of the
more noted rulings is Smith v Trafford Housing Trust.60 The court expressed “real disquiet” at
the disciplinary action against the plaintiff for expressing his opposition to same sex civil
marriage on his Facebook page. The court found that the defendant had breached the
employment contract by demoting Smith as a result of his Facebook posting. However, Smith
was only awarded a small amount being the difference between his contractual salary and the
twelve weeks following the assumption of his new role. Smith’s European Convention of
Human Rights claims (arts. 9 and 10) were dismissed because his employer was a private
entity and therefore the Human Rights Act 1998 was inapplicable.61
56
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This distinction, however, may suggest a false hope in the public sector.62 It is not clear a
public authority would have infringed upon a worker’s expression rights under the ECHR
given the Smith facts. The decisions culminating in the European Court of Human Rights’
finding in Eweida and others v UK63 demonstrate. There were four complainants in this case.
One of them, Ms. Ladele, worked for a public authority as a registrar for births, deaths and
marriages. Her case is of instruction here. Under the local authority’s “Dignity for All”
equality and diversity policy, she was compelled to officiate civil partnerships for same sex
couples. As a Christian she objected.64 Eventually she was dismissed. In total, three
employees objected to conducting civil partnerships as part of their work. Ladele was the
only one to bring a claim. In dismissing her case, the English Court of Appeal drew attention
to the policy of the public authority and how Ladele’s stand obstructed that legitimate aim:
it appears to me that the fact that Ms Ladele’s refusal to perform civil partnerships was based on
her religious view of marriage could not justify the conclusion that Islington should not be
allowed to implement its aim to the full, namely that all registrars should perform civil
partnerships as part of its Dignity for All policy. Ms Ladele was employed in a public job and
was working for a public authority; she was being required to perform a purely secular task,
which was being treated as part of her job; Ms Ladele’s refusal to perform that task involved
discriminating against gay people in the course of that job; she was being asked to perform the
task because of Islington’s Dignity for All policy, whose laudable aim was to avoid, or at least
minimise, discrimination both among Islington’s employees, and as between Islington (and its
employees) and those in the community they served”.65

The ECtHR was not overly elaborate in its decision.66 It accepted the Court of Appeal’s
reasoning as falling within the margin of appreciation:67 the public authority’s aim was
legitimate and undertaken in a reasonable manner.68 With regards to the Smith facts, the case
may be concluded in a similar manner.69 It is worth noting that some decisions, such as
Smith, have considered Lord Justice Mummery’s often-discussed comments regarding the
application of the Human Rights Act, 1998 to a private sector employer in X v Y.70 This
reasoning has still not been successfully applied. Social media, free speech and the workplace
may provide a situation within which to consider the matter anew.
UK employment law generally accepts potential harm to business reputation as grounds
justifying discipline or termination of workers for work-related social media commentary.
Enhancing protection for employers, a well-crafted policy71 or contract clause about social
media usage can permit an employer to take a wide variety of action. More generally, the
62
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scope of workplace policies has been extensive regarding the medium. Social media policies
will often include a broad provision defining unacceptable use of social media that causes
offence or brings the company into disrepute.72
Part of the difficulty with this issue, employment law is challenged when faced with
scenarios of dual identity. In Game Retail Ltd v Laws,73 Laws held the position of risk and
loss prevention investigator for Game Retail since 1997. Events leading to his termination
seem to have begun when he used his personal Twitter account to monitor Game Retail
stores’ Twitter accounts (as part of his position). For a period of about a year, he posted (what
the employer called) offensive, threatening and obscene tweets74 which would have been
received by those who followed him (a mixture of individuals and store staff under his work
purview). Agreeing with the employer’s characterization,75 the Employment Appeals
Tribunal overturned the lower tribunal’s finding for Laws, ruling that his dismissal was
within the reasonable band of responses. It should be noted, though, that the Employment
Tribunal’s conclusion included a reduction of 40% due to Laws’ own role in the matter.76 In
finding against Laws, the EAT made the critical observation that Laws had not set any
restrictions on his Twitter account and, more importantly it would seem, failed to create a
separate work account. Though easy to admonish Laws for mixing work with personal
remarks on Twitter, Game Retail hinted at the outcome if Laws had maintained two separate
accounts and yet made the same impugned remarks.77 Unfortunately, the EAT did not take up
the invitation to provide clarity in this area.78 It is suggested that if these same remarks were
drawn to the attention of Game Retail, the retailer would have taken the same action and the
likelihood (reinforced by the discussion of case law below) would be the affirmation of his
dismissal be any subsequent tribunal.
Another case of mixing work and personal identities in social media, in Crisp v Apple Retail
(UK) Ltd.79 the employment tribunal ruled that Apple was justified in terminating Crisp’s
employment for posting comments critical of the Apple workplace and its products.80 The
issue was one of misconduct and the test in English law is rather elastic. The tribunal found
that there was a genuine belief in the misconduct; there were reasonable grounds for this
belief; and that a reasonable investigation of the allegation had been conducted. 81 Emphasis
was placed on the “great importance of image to the company”.82 Even though Crisp did not
identify himself as an Apple employee on his Facebook page, the tribunal was satisfied that
the friends to which these comments were accessible (Crisp had restricted the visibility of his
72
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comments to only his friends) knew that Apple employed him. Despite the privacy settings,
Crisp did not have control over what his friends did with the comments. In this case a coworker passed on his comments to Apple.83 The claimant’s freedom of expression argument
was dismissed on the basis his comments, first, were deemed unimportant as compared to
political opinions and, second, their damaging potential to Apple’s reputation.84
Crisp stands out as a particularly useful decision for the present discussion. Criticism of the
ruling here refutes the first basis above and elaborates on the second. The tribunal was
remarkably certain Crisp’s comments were of low quality and as such not worthy of
protection. However, the mention of “political opinion” as an example of higher quality
speech is disconcerting: remarks made on social media pertaining to the workplace seem
unworthy of protection. Some of the claimant’s comments related to the functionality of
Apple products and so the question (often posed in defamation cases) of a public interest
would at the least be arguable, given the prominent sales of these items. Recalling defamation
law, protection from reputational harm is not an absolute right for the law permits challenges
to reputation. In this instance, the challenge by Crisp was that Apple products do not function
properly. Furthermore, protected speech should not be limited to remarks about government.
There is a public interest in discussing matters pertaining to private entities, for example,
because of the products they sell to the public as consumers. In short, the tribunal’s remarks
on speech do nothing for the contemporary. The ranking of Crisp’s speech is a difficult
distinction to maintain and one that has not been witnessed in recent successful defamation
actions. Crisp betrays a troubling negative perspective of social media speech.
Dismissals are upheld where the employment contract contains a clause (broad as it may be)
governing social media use as it relates to the workplace. Preece v JD Wetherspoon plc85
illustrates. It is another decision where a worker was terminated (for gross misconduct) based
on her use of Facebook as a “vent for her upset and anger [one] evening”86 following a series
of encounters with customers. Wetherspoon had a broad policy on this subject in its
employee handbook: “The respondent reserved the right to take disciplinary action should the
contents of any blog, including pages on sites such as MySpace or Facebook ‘be found to
lower the reputation of the organization, staff or customers and/or contravene the company’s
equal opportunity policy.’”87 Two customers had subjected Preece to physical and verbal
threats during a shift. She asked them to leave. Later that evening an individual (allegedly the
customers’ daughter) made a series of abusive phone calls to her at the workplace. At this
point, Preece began to comment negatively about the customers on her Facebook page. Other
workers joined in. The customers’ daughter saw these postings and made a complaint to the
respondent. The tribunal found that: there was a genuine belief in the misconduct; there were
reasonable grounds for this belief; and that a reasonable investigation of the allegation had
been conducted.88 Dismissal was within the range of reasonable responses. 89 Absent social
media, Preece would likely have made the same comments orally but may have escaped
termination (if not discipline) if that were the case. The platform provided a record of the
violation of the employer’s policy.90 Preece exemplified how social media turns slander into
83
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libel, regardless of the impressions social media users may have as to the function of the
platform.
It is highly likely that potential (as opposed to actual) harm to the employer’s business
reputation will continue to ground a consistent line of authority; though this standard is
questioned below. The decision of the European Court of Human Rights in Pay v UK91
illustrates.92 Lawrence Pay was a probation officer working predominantly with sex
offenders. He was dismissed after his employer discovered that he was involved in activities
including the merchandising of products connected with bondage, domination and sadomasochism as well as his performing in hedonist and fetish clubs (photographs of him
involved in acts of bondage, domination and sado-masochism were available on the internet).
The employer took the view that these activities were incompatible with his role and
responsibilities as a probation officer working with sex offenders. Mr. Pay complained that
his dismissal was unfair because it infringed his Convention rights under Article 8;
specifically the conduct was an important part of his sexual expression and sexual orientation.
Furthermore, his performances on stage (during which he wore a mask) were conducted in a
private club and those who attended would have shared this form of sexual expression. The
Court ruled against Pay. It relied upon the fact that he “refused to accept that these activities
might be incompatible with his role as a probation officer” as well as the fact that it was not
until quite late in the process that he indicated a willingness to remove links to the photos of
him.”93 The ruling offered the following guidance:
An interference with the rights protected by that Article can be considered justified only if the
conditions of its second paragraph are satisfied. Accordingly, the interference must be “in
accordance with the law”, have an aim which is legitimate under this paragraph and must be
“necessary in a democratic society” for a legitimate aim if it answers a pressing social need and, in
particular, is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. It is for the national authorities to make
the initial assessment of necessity, though the final evaluation as to whether the reasons cited for
the interference are relevant and sufficient is one for this Court. A margin of appreciation is left to
contracting states in the context of this assessment, which varies according to the nature of the
activities restricted and of the aims pursued by the restrictions. . . The nature of the activities in
this context includes the extent to which they impinge upon the public domain. 94

While phrased as an inconsistency between Pay’s conduct and his employment, a legitimate
aim was the protection of the employer’s reputation. There is no criticism of that point in
itself here. Rather, what constitutes harm to that reputation is not an area where there has
been penetrating analysis. The difficulty with Pay is that it is a borderline decision. By
finding his off-duty activities to be inconsistent with the nature of his work with sex
offenders, the insinuation was that his out of work activities were themselves deviant. The
facts in this case may not have been ideal for a precedent-setting decision on the observation
of Article 8 rights. Still, his extra-curricular activities should not be so easily viewed as out of
step with his workplace duties.95 His status as a worker subsumed his identity as an individual
to the extent that his off-duty activities were found to impact his role in the workplace. Pay
confirms that the employer significantly contributes to fixing the boundary for expression
protected under the ECHR.
Based on the above decisions, business reputation is likely to be interpreted in a manner that
is so robust as to quell comments about, within and related to the workplace. Important
91
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considerations include: comments which were posted over a period of time; the existence of
(and weight placed on) a policy related to the company’s image; the impugned comments
being read by others (in Preece this included the customers who were the subject of some of
the comments); how the worker uses the social media platform(s) (though Smith and Game
Retail suggest that this may be a contested point). Violation of a social media policy usually
leads to dismissal.96 Though early decisions and other factors will likely arise, an important
consideration in the adjudication of these issues is motive. Motive for a worker’s remarks on
a social media platform stands out as the more accurate basis for dismissal in Crisp.97
Distinguishing his remarks from those of a whistleblower,98 Crisp seemed motivated by
embarrassing his employer. The duty of loyalty in employment, then, is part of the
measurement in weighing the worker’s right to freedom of expression against the interests of
the employer.99
Distilling the above employment decisions, the picture we have of business reputation is that
of a fragile entity that any negative comment may damage, if not break. In comparison,
criticism of government remains a praiseworthy aim because of the positive implications:
government is held to account. Could criticism of employers (as providers of services or as
manufacturers) not have a similar impact? A strict view of business reputation is not the only
interpretation available. These decisions contrast poorly with the strong movement witnessed
in UK defamation law where there has been a concerted effort to expand protection of free
speech. Speech in the workplace appears to be a realm in which freedom is not as
expansively secured in the UK.100 In the next two sections, different means of balancing
competing interests are discussed.
(iii) Canada’s treatment of social media in employment law
There is evidence of a more nuanced treatment in Canadian employment law. Distinctions are
being made in Canadian labour arbitration decisions, for example with regards to different
social media platforms. In Chatham-Kent (Municipality) v CAW-Canada Local 127,101 a
personal care worker created a website (using MSN Spaces) that was accessible to the public
(though she claimed to have believed the site to be private) containing “resident information
and pictures without resident consent and … inappropriate comments … about residents
entrusted to her care.”102 The arbitrator relied upon a number of factors (such as “her
96
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comments, their hostility, and the language used to express them”)103 including the
widespread accessibility to the public of this site to uphold the grievor’s termination. In
decisions where Facebook is the platform in question, arbitrators are considering grievors’
privacy settings when rendering their decisions. In Cargojet,104 the arbitrator distinguished
between Facebook and blogs105 because the former permitted subscribers to limit the
audience to which comments were made.106 Facebook posts cannot be automatically viewed
as comments made to the world because each person has editing privileges on the account.
Still, Facebook settings will not excuse all comments. The following passage illustrates:
To summarize, there are numerous factors that render Mr. W’s misconduct very serious. His
Facebook postings were frequent. They were derogatory to both [the employer and W’s manager].
They were prolonged, over more than a 16 month period. They were premeditated and deliberate,
not a momentary aberration. He twice failed to stop making them when it was brought to his
attention, on two occasions, that they were inappropriate. He failed to acknowledge any
wrongdoing or show any remorse when [his employer] met with him on September 30 and
October 5, 2010. For the reasons discussed above, I put little weight upon his apology letters or the
issue of whether [W’s manager’s] conduct amounted to provocation. There is no provocation
regarding his derogatory postings that pertain to [his employer]. He was not a long service
employee. Rather, he was a temporary part-time employee with less than 18 months of service.
Accordingly, long service is not a mitigating factor. Taking all of this into consideration, I find
that [the employer] had just cause to terminate his employment and I dismiss his grievance
regarding this discharge.”107

Bell offers an extreme example insofar as the grievor failed on all considerations; but the
decision remains useful for its listing of different factors which informed the arbitrator’s final
decision. In Canada, harm to an employer’s reputation is not so readily assumed where social
media is the medium.108
In Cargojet, the grievor was terminated for comments made on her Facebook page. The
arbitrator found this unjust; though the relationship was broken to the extent that
reinstatement was not recommended. The issue was whether the grievor had violated the
employer’s workplace violence policy when she wrote of striking a male co-worker in the
groin with her steel-toed boots. Finding that the grievor’s comments had “only minimally
impaired the company’s reputation for service”,109 the arbitrator found that the remarks were
more in the nature of “derogatory commentary on the relationships among staff at the
workplace, and a personal threat against her supervisor.”110 A threat of violence by one
worker against a co-worker is not speech which would be desirable to protect in the
workplace. And yet, the harm to the employer’s reputation was not the basis for upholding
103
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the decision not to return her to the workplace.111 While it could have been disposed of as a
speech case, Cargojet illustrated that harm to an employer’s business reputation is not only a
wide spectrum, but also a troubling one if we desire some level of consistency in applying
such a measure.112
Where social media speech is squarely the issue, adjudication of dismissal (or discipline) for
social media speech demands attention to the circumstances and context in which the
comments were made. To this point, duration of time between remarks has been considered.
In Canada Post Corp v CUPW,113 the grievor posted messages to her Facebook page,
reaching more than fifty of her Facebook friends, amongst them were co-workers, for over a
month. These postings “contained a number of derogatory, mocking statements about her
supervisors and the Corporation.”114 The sustained barrage of remarks distinguished this
situation from that of one-off venting of frustration. Comments which may have been ignored
if they were spoken, once written online, were recognized as “mean, nasty, and highly
personal. They go well beyond general criticism of management and essentially target one
person with a degree of venom that is unmatched in other social media cases.”115 This was no
“momentary lapse” or “short-lived fit of rage”.116 A worker’s written attacks aimed at a
supervisor (whose identity was alluded to but was not named) using her Facebook page can
also lead to irreparable damage to the employment relationship. In Campeau v Yellow Quill
First Nation,117 the grievor’s remarks were described as follows: “she accused him of lying,
of being ‘unprofessional’, questioned his personal hygiene, said that he could not do his job,
that he was unqualified and that she was a ‘threat to his lies’.”118 The arbitrator upheld her
termination because these attacks destroyed any possible work relationship she could have
had with the supervisor. These characterizations suggest that venting at a moment in time
may be permissible, even through social media, but a sustained series of comments over (for
example) a month will not be tolerated. Remarks over a short period, depending on their
content, can be conclusive. For example, comments over a two-hour period involving
aggressive, sexual remarks about a co-worker have been sufficient to warrant dismissal.119
Two decisions assist in determining what should be a clear consideration in the assessment of
speech on social media by workers. In EV Logistics v Retail Wholesale Union, Local 580
(Discharge Grievance),120 the then twenty-two year old grievor posted discriminatory
remarks regarding “those good for nothing people from South Asia aka INDIA”.121 When
confronted with these postings by his employer, the employee admitted to suffering from
depression and indicated that he had been encouraged to post the material. He offered to
apologize to the employer and anyone who viewed the blog. Ultimately EV Logistics
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terminated his employment because there was a “direct and prejudicial relationship between
[the] expressed values and EV Logistics’ interests”.122 The arbitrator found termination too
extreme for “the reckless ranting of an emotionally impulsive young person”.123 The
arbitrator believed the grievor was immature (instead of the conduct being related to any
medical condition). The ruling constitutes cause for concern. Discriminatory comments by an
employee made to the public at large must be the epitome of reputational harm for an
employer. In Canada, the value of equal treatment is enshrined at different levels of law (i.e.
the Charter, provincial human rights codes). In contrast (and by way of illustration of the
divergence of opinion at this fledgling stage of the development of a body of jurisprudence in
the area), the decision in Wasaya Airways LP v Air Line Pilots Assn, International (Wyndels
Grievance)124 offers a preferable perspective. The grievor posted a note on his Facebook page
which was derogatory towards First Nations peoples. Another employee added his own
derogatory comments to this posting. Their employer’s client base was composed largely of
individuals of this denomination. A third employee made the employer aware of these posts
as she found them offensive. The company terminated the grievor’s employment and
suspended the other employee who added his own comment. Upholding the termination, the
arbitrator found there was significant risk the comments would harm the employer’s business
reputation.125
A point requiring further consideration in Wasaya was that the arbitrator equated Facebook
posts with any form of internet posting: “where the internet is used to display commentary or
opinion the individual doing so must be assumed to have known there is potential for
virtually world-wide access to those statements.”126 There was no evidence provided
regarding the grievor’s Facebook privacy settings or how many “friends” he had on that
medium. Though an aside, the absence of such evidence coupled with the arbitrator’s
comment regarding Facebook potentially leading to world-wide access are troubling. The
remark ignores the level of control a worker may exert over who views his social media
comments. The settings of any social media platform must be a consideration where use of
the medium forms the basis of discipline at work. The topic relates to the notion that
circulation for news agencies is the same as audience online.127 And yet, social media
challenges reliance on this factor as definitive. Remarks in social media have been deemed
serious enough to justify summary dismissal from employment where the potential audience
may be limited. The suggestion is that fixating on the number of readers is not determinative.
Rather significance rests in the nature of the statements made.
Complainants’ own role in escalating the situation may be more evident with social media,
but as yet, this has not been identified as a mitigating factor. In a case involving sexual
harassment as one of the issues, the arbitration panel found that the complainant’s
“communications [on Facebook] might have mitigated, though not excused, the Grievor’s
blame for his part in the exchange. We are struck by the thought that the Complainant’s
messages, posted early in the conversation on a public part of the Facebook site, may have
been nicely calculated to cut the Grievor where he would bleed, so to speak.”128 As noted
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earlier with regards to the English employment tribunal decision in Preece, provocation may
be a consideration in social media cases.129 The contention is an intriguing one since it may
be suggested that the comments were prompted in response to certain other remarks or
actions by the employer, thereby constituting an opinion of events. To assess this argument,
the arbitrator in AUPE summarized the law (taking into consideration both the civil and
criminal law): “1) was there some act or series of acts that reasonably could be seen as
provocative; and 2) was there a response against the perpetrator of the act(s) that was
proportional and proximate to the provocative action.”130
Returning to charting out a space for discipline based on social media postings, in City of
Toronto v TPFFA, Local 3888 (Bowman),131 the grievor of 2.5 years work experience was
terminated for off-duty use of his Twitter account, specifically, over a period roughly
equivalent to his time with the Fire Services, “a series of comments on his Twitter account,
many of which were sexist, misogynist and racist. Some were offensive in their discussion of
people with disabilities. Others were offensive in their references to homeless people. One
invaded the privacy of others. Many were jokes, juvenile in nature, with sexual themes.”132
These tweets were also published in a report by a national Canadian newspaper alleging an
unwelcoming culture within the Toronto fire force. While the conduct was considered a
breach of City and Fire Services policies, the remarkably public manner in which the story
arose damaged the reputation of the Service and must be viewed as a key factor in Bowman’s
termination.133 The labour arbitration case law confirms both the importance of the
employer’s reputation as well as its right to protect its reputation with a view to those for
whom it provides its service where a worker’s off-duty conduct is the topic.134 The fact of
public sector employment adds to the consideration, as there is concern for a balance of
rights.135 A serious breach of a discrimination policy or the provincial Human Rights Code
may harm this reputation and justify the employer’s subsequent response. 136 In comparison to
the English approach which has permitted discipline for the guilty act alone (without other
factors being considered), in Bowman the arbitrator relied upon the absence of sincerity in the
grievor’s apology established by post-incident behaviour (such as statements to a counsellor)
to uphold the termination. This conduct demonstrated that Bowman remained oblivious to the
wrongs committed as he tried to “excuse, minimize and rationalize his conduct.”137 The
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arbitrator found the evidence to constitute very serious misconduct as she upheld Bowman’s
termination.
If Bowman was a clear case, the companion decision (though from a different arbitrator) of
City of Toronto v. TPFFA, Local 3888 (Edwards)138 was not. Both these decisions arose from
overlapping facts insofar as Edwards (a “Black Jamaican Canadian male”)139 called out
Bowman for a racial slur in one of his tweets, though he did so in a non-confrontational
manner. This response and some others of Edwards’ tweets were also part of the national
newspaper coverage forming the departure point for Bowman. Edwards was terminated for
breaching City and Fire Services policies as well as the harm his conduct caused to the Fire
Services’ recruitment efforts. The basis for this action were tweets in Edwards’ Twitter
account (in which he identified himself as a Toronto firefighter): suggesting giving a woman
a “swat in the back of the head” to “reset the brain”; another tweet in which Edwards wrote
“go get it sweetie” to a potential female applicant to the Fire Services; and finally the
aforementioned tweet in which Edwards used a derogatory ethnic and racial term. The Fire
Services emphasised the importance of reputation, noting the Standard Operating Guideline
(“SOG”) regarding Public Relations which stated at section 2.02: “It is imperative that while
in the public eye the Firefighters are portrayed in an image that is fitting with the public
perception.”140 Though the arbitrator substituted termination with a three-day suspension,141
Edwards suggests that it is still worth employers disciplining (even terminating) for social
media usage because the benchmark for harm (anything that could reflect poorly on the
employer) remains robust.
Both of these Toronto Fire Services cases suggest a more profound potential to social media.
If social media is the equivalent of a conversation, the platforms are then a mirror to society.
By publishing offensive comments, the authors expose themselves (as demonstrated in
Edwards) to a potential corrective response. Adjudicators of workplace discipline involving
social media must be aware of this powerful positive potential. Certainly social media blur
the lines between work and off-duty conduct, but part of that obfuscation is the powerful
possibility for social media to effect positive social change.
On the matter of the potential for social change, United Steel Workers, Local 9548 v Tenaris
Algoma Tubes (D Grievance)142 offered pointed commentary. The male grievor posted
remarks about a female co-worker’s (though unnamed, he did allude to her identity) ability
and suggested that a violent and humiliating sexual act be performed on her.143 The remark
was visible to all who looked at the grievor’s Facebook page. Within the context of social
change and employment, the notion of the poisoned workplace comes to the forefront. 144 In
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Tenaris, the collective agreement was applicable: “Article 10 No Harassment or
Discrimination states: ‘The Company and the Union are committed to providing a work
environment where all employees are treated with respect and dignity. Each individual has
the right to an atmosphere which promotes respectful interactions and is free from
discrimination and harassment.’”145 In the province of Ontario, the Occupational Health and
Safety Act146 directly addresses this matter. This legislation was referred to in Tenaris. The
amended statute has been described as having “real potential to protect the emotional health
of workers who are the victims of violence”. The legislation, as it applies to words, has been
interpreted as follows: “The workplace violence is the utterance of the words. There need not
be evidence of an immediate ability to do physical harm. There need not be evidence of intent
to do harm. No employee is required, as the receiver of the words, to live or work in fear of
attack. No employee is required to look over their shoulder because they fear that which
might follow.”147 As words constituting threats of violence (even though not of immediate
harm) falling under the purview of the Occupational Health and Safety Act remarks on social
media platforms carry enhanced potential for discipline (up to and including dismissal).
Imbuing social issues (such as sexist and misogynistic remarks) with legal implications by
way of social media speech may be one of the most engaging, controversial and important
matters to be taken up by the intersection of user-generated content platforms and
employment law.
This potential depends upon courts giving effect to legislation. In the UK, the Protection from
Harassment Act 1997 may be applicable, but doubt has been cast on the range of scenarios
applicable to the Act. In Veakins v Kier Islingtson Ltd.,148 Maurice Kay LJ, for the court,
wrote with regards to a claim for stress made through the Act: “It seems that [the challenge in
making a claim for stress based in negligence] may be causing more employees to seek
redress by reference to harassment and the statutory tort, although it is doubtful whether the
legislature had the workplace in mind when passing an Act that was principally directed at
‘stalking’ and similar cases. It should not be thought from this unusually one-sided case that
stress at work will often give rise to liability for harassment.”149
(iv) Concerted activity versus public disclosure
By way of rounding out discussion, a widely publicized case from the US helps shape
assessment.
In American Medical Response of Connecticut, Inc v. International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Local 443150 a client of the plaintiff (AMR) complained about the social media
posting of its employee Dawnmarie Souza. The employer asked her for a response but she
was refused (by her supervisor) the opportunity to have assistance from the union. To voice
her displeasure, Souza made several vulgar entries on her Facebook page in order to ridicule
her supervisor – for example she identified him as a psychiatric patient. The posting elicited
supportive comments for Souza and further negative commentary about the supervisor. AMR
terminated Souza for violating its policy prohibiting any depiction of the company on social
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media. The NLRB supported Souza’s case as it took the view that criticisms on social
networking sites about an employer constituted protected activity under s.7 of the US
National Labor Relations Act. The case was later settled out of court.151 Souza is a
remarkable case itself and the social media aspect only enhances its pertinence. 152 The
National Labour Relations Board established the following criteria for determining when a
Facebook posting loses “protected concerted activity status”: “a four point test applies: (1)
the place of the discussion; (2) the subject matter of the discussion; (3) the nature of the
employees outburst; and (4) whether the outburst was, in any way, provoked by an
employer’s unfair labor practice.”153
The difference in levels of protection afforded by the NLRA154 as compared to the law of
England is illustrated with reference to the amendments contained in the Enterprise and
Regulatory Reform Act 2013155 regarding the public interest factor in assessing protection for
whistleblowing in the UK. (This comparison is not noted to suggest that social media will
necessarily be the vehicle for whistleblowing; though its potential is evident.) The first resort
for the whistleblower is to confidentially relay the information to someone in a management
position and only when the confidential route does not yield a response to then release
information to the general public.156 The comparison between the US and the UK is apt
because the reforms to whistleblowing in the UK suggest a more profound chilling effect in
an area of identified importance.157 Protected disclosures (whistleblowing) as defined by the
UK’s Employment Rights Act 1996 are limited. The ERRA curbs this category by inserting a
public interest test.158 A comparison with the interpretation of s.7 of the US National Labor
Relations Act demonstrates how strict the amended ERA 1996 is. Where in the US a worker
may be able to demonstrate that she has participated in a concerted activity under the NLRA,
she will be protected from retaliatory actions such as dismissal. However, under the ERRA, a
worker must first demonstrate that the matter was of public interest; that is, something which
is of interest to those outside of the workplace.159 And so there are two stages of assessment
for disclosure: first, whether the disclosure qualifies under s.43B of the ERA 1996; and
second, whether the disclosure is in the public (wider) interest. If the disclosure is found not
to have been made in good faith (a term which is not defined but which has been restricted to
“one of the wrongs listed in section 43B of the ERA 1996”),160 the ERRA now permits an
employment tribunal to reduce any award for unfair dismissal pursuant to a protected
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disclosure which was not made in good faith by 25%.161 Concerted activity in the US is given
some breadth of coverage. However, even the behaviour of those who are whistleblowers is
strictly construed in England. Workplace speech garners the potential for better protection in
the US; whereas the UK appears to be suspicious of remarks which possibly negatively affect
commercial activities and so adopts a strict approach to such comments.
IV. Scope within the law
Underlying the above discussion has been the scope for liability. A claim is not automatically
successful because it meets the conditions of tort liability. The courts have found that people
must endure certain annoyances as a result of the exigencies of life. This idea prompts two
considerations. First, at any workplace there is likely to be complaining and even emotional
venting. Second, reputations may be challenged; that is, a pristine reputation is not a right.
Consequently, the staunch position taken with regards to social media in the workplace
appears stubbornly resistant.
There has been scope within the law, requiring acceptance of a certain amount of discomfort
encapsulated in the Latin phrase de minimis. We know from the common law of tort that not
all contact between two individuals constitutes battery. Battery does not arise from “the least
touching of another in anger”, as Chief Justice Holt wrote in the 1704 decision of Cole v
Turner.162 Putting the debate surrounding a hostility requirement aside, Lord Goff
commented on this nebulous territory of contact. His rationale for an exception of contact in
the ordinary conduct of everyday life was as follows:
… a broader exception has been created to allow for the exigencies of everyday life. Generally
speaking consent is a defence to battery; and most of the physical contacts of ordinary life are
not actionable because they are impliedly consented to by all who move in society and so expose
themselves to the risk of bodily contact. 163

This approach was followed in Wainwright v Home Office164 where Lord Hoffmann applied
Lord Goff’s remarks in Collins and defined battery as “a touching of the person with what is
sometimes called hostile intent but which [Lord Goff] redefined as meaning any intentional
physical contact which was not ‘generally acceptable in the ordinary conduct of human life.’”
The UK’s Protection from Harassment Act 1997 (as a contemporary example of lawmaking)
also bears out this scope. The Act requires there to be a series of incidents (more than two) in
order to ground a claim. Here the words of Jacob LJ in Ferguson v British Gas Trading Ltd165
sketch out some of the landscape:
I accept that the course of conduct must be grave before the offence or tort of harassment is proved
… It has never been suggested generally that the scope of the civil wrong is restricted because it is
also a crime. What makes the wrong of harassment different and special is because … in life one
has to put up with a certain amount of annoyance: things have got to be fairly severe before the
law, civil or criminal, will intervene.

These instances of scope anticipate the more detailed discussion below.
(i) Towards a balance of interests
With social media, tort and employment law have converged in a thought-provoking manner.
Defamation law has influenced the adjudication of speech in the employment setting where
social media usage is at issue. The defamation model permits conduct that qualifies as a tort
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but has established (and continues to develop) defences to fit the circumstances. 166 Using the
defamation model would not be a matter of simply transplanting the tort into the employment
setting. Rather, there would be a call for nuance. Consider the decision in Crisp noted above.
An employer should still be able to dismiss a worker who undertakes actions as did Crisp.
There must be scope for employers to protect their business reputations from such workers.
Another parameter mentioned above is when an employee uses a social media platform to
express discriminatory remarks (a discussion undertaken in Canadian labour arbitration
decisions). Still, there is an expanse of expression before one gets to these signposts.167 Here
is where the focus of this paper has been: the common law is a remarkable tool in many ways
and there is scope within it to allow for the principles of free expression defended in one of
its disciplines (tort) to be repeated in another (employment). UK law provides a good basis
for this discussion.
In the United Kingdom, there is a rule prohibiting government from making a claim in
defamation.168 The basis for this rule is a concern that permitting government to sue in tort
would have a chilling effect: it may diminish if not eliminate discussion of government and
undercut the notion of keeping government accountable to the people. There is a question as
to why in the private sector speech should be limited in a different manner. 169 Postings by
workers who criticize their employers can also be a productive form of speech (depending on
the motivation). The right is fettered as employers should be able to protect their interests.
The current state of the law, however, is unsatisfactory. There is room at present for a better
balancing of interests: postings on social media should not be treated prima facie as
damaging to a company’s reputation. Recall that the above decisions from the UK have
primarily imposed the “heaviest sanction possible under labour law”170 for the exercise of a
right enshrined under the ECHR. Social media provides a forum in which discussion may
take place. The lessons from developments in defamation law are instructive. This tort
operates in a unique manner insofar as the defenses to a claim are of great importance to the
action: speech may be found to be defamatory and still not be the subject of legal sanction
because robust defenses signify that speech should (generally) be protected. In employment
law, tension exists between the duty of loyalty and the Convention right. And yet, to suggest
that the duty of loyalty automatically trumps the right is remarkable for it belittles one of the
more celebrated of rights.171 Distinctions must be made. For example, there may be
protection for comments made to a limited audience of colleagues and/or friends versus
remarks about a company made to the world at large via the Internet.172 The concern
identified here is why the use of social media by workers should be treated in a less nuanced
manner than remarks subject to defamation law.
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The employment decisions demonstrate how the law deals poorly with multiple identities: an
individual making comments on a social media platform to friends is viewed differently when
he is identified as a worker employed by a particular enterprise. 173 Social media issues in the
employment setting suggest the need for innovation in legal treatment. There should also be
greater room for free speech by workers: a right to free expression which should not be
automatically curbed as a result of business reputation; but where the individual’s intention
was to impugn or discredit the employer (with care taken to consider whistleblowing
circumstances) the speech may lose protected status and be the subject of legal recourse. And
so some threshold should be met in regards to discipline (up to and including termination) of
workers for remarks made on social media within the expansive employment setting. An
example can be found in the seriousness threshold found in s.1 of the UK Defamation Act
2013 should be adapted to the employment setting.
Regarding the threshold of seriousness, a discussion has already been underway in
employment case law where the respondent has been required to establish evidence of harm.
The decision in Whitham v Club 24 Ltd t/a Ventura174 illustrated. The tribunal ruled that the
employer’s decision to dismiss for gross misconduct was beyond the range of reasonable
responses.175 Whitham had posted comments to her Facebook page which outlined a certain
level of frustration with one of her employer’s clients.176 The workplace policy on e-mail and
internet use stated: “You should also remember that your obligation of confidentiality extends
outside the workplace and that posting information about your job on the internet (for
example, on social networking sites such as Facebook and MySpace) may lead to disciplinary
proceedings and/or dismissal itself”.177 One of the factors leading the tribunal to its decision
was the absence of “evidence that the client [Volkswagen] suffered any embarrassment or
that there was any likelihood of actual harm to the relationship between the two
companies.”178 Whitham stands out because it suggested that tribunals need not simply accept
the potential without some evidence.179
Following on from Witham, another decision of the Northern Ireland Industrial Tribunal in
Irwin v Charles Hurst Ltd.180 also challenged acceptance of potential harm. Irwin was
dismissed for posting uncharitable remarks on the Facebook page called “Justice for Cody”
set up in memory of a dog who died as a result of injuries sustained from being set on fire. A
customer of the respondent made a complaint and encouraged others to complain to Hurst as
well. Irwin was summarily dismissed for failing to “ensure that his conduct whilst off duty
did not impact on the company.”181 Here too the tribunal found that freedom of expression
was not interfered with, but not because it was inapplicable. Rather, the tribunal wrote that
dismissal “may be a justifiable interference with the right to freedom of expression, which is
qualified by the responsibility to exercise that right in such a way that the reputation and
rights of others is protected.”182 Furthermore, on the point of off-duty conduct leading to
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termination, the tribunal offered: “it may be reasonable for an employer to treat an
employee’s actions as gross misconduct where the employee has made comments, even
though they may not be work related.”183 Still, it highlighted the absence of evidence
establishing actual damage: “The tribunal does not consider that a finding of actual damage to
the respondent’s business interests/reputation was one that the respondent was entitled to
make on the basis of the evidence which was before the disciplinary and appeal hearings and
in this regard fell outside the band of reasonable responses thus rendering the dismissal
unfair.”184 A key fact was the respondent’s failure to even inquire into the fact of any
financial loss.185 Declining the opportunity to make an order for reinstatement,186 the tribunal
instead made a compensatory award, reduced by 80% for Irwin’s responsibility in bringing
about his dismissal. Irwin falls short of an enthusiastic endorsement of freedom of expression
because the employment relationship had been broken so as to render reinstatement
impractical. Though these decisions are insufficient to establish a line of cases, the suggestion
here is that in order to pass the threshold of seriousness the comments must (in the words of
s.1(2) of the Defamation Act 2013) have caused or be likely to cause the employer serious
financial loss. Reinforcing the threshold, though prior to the Act’s coming into force, the
Court of Appeal in Cammish v. Hughes187 wrote: “The law does not provide remedies for
inconsequential statements, that is, of trivial content or import. It is necessary that there
should be some threshold test of seriousness to avoid normal social banter or discourtesy
ending up in litigation and to avoid interfering with the right to freedom of expression
conferred by article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights.”
One of the difficulties in the interaction between law and social media is users’ attitudes
towards the different platforms. Consistently in the cases noted above, users have expressed
the belief that the medium provides another platform for conversation and not (as the law
views it) as a publication of comments in a permanent form. The emphasis for users is on the
social and therefore is understood as beyond legal scrutiny. The law, however, does not share
this view. A simple caution may be proposed: remarks of a dubious nature should be spoken
and not written.188 Here there is room for debate centred on the notion of audience. It is
contended that nuance is needed in the understanding of this term. Using the analogy of
conversation, we do not converse with all friends or acquaintances simultaneously at one time
but particular individuals. Topics for discussion are sometimes had with particular audiences
of friends. Identifying an audience, however, places more responsibility in the hands of the
commentator. The Canadian decisions show greater awareness of privacy settings and how
employing stricter settings demonstrates an intention to control to whom the remarks are
made. Conversely, failure to amend settings imputes an intention that the remark was made to
an unlimited audience. To this we may ask: what is the awareness of the user to the expanse
of online conversations; that is, the potential that the remark may be exponentially shared
(such as in Crisp)? An underlying assumption is that privacy settings form a panacea when in
fact they do not because Facebook (as one example) does not grant users the capacity to limit
an audience’s use of information received. User attitudes will change over time and a greater
awareness of the risk in making online remarks will grow (for example, children will grow up
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being taught of the adverse potential and will hopefully develop habits around this
knowledge). So too must users’ capacity to limit how far their remarks may travel through
social media platforms and beyond. And so, returning to the prominent analogy, social media
is not truly akin to an online conversation. This is how users may understand the way in
which they employ these media. However, in a usual verbal conversation there is no other
party that is monitoring the remarks. On social media there is: algorithms are created so as to
build upon discussions had over online media. This issue extends beyond the employment
setting and moves into the contentious area of data retrieval on social media.189 Still, the point
is that there must be more widespread recognition of what happens on social media before
change arises in other areas. In the employment setting, unfortunately, the rate of change
(expanding protection for remarks made about, at or related in some way to the workplace)
will be slow. For this reason, the seriousness threshold is an important factor, but one
complicated by the difficulties experienced in the law with multiple identities. The
benchmark for legal sanction in the employment setting should be moved, but not in a
manner which robs employers of protection for business interests.
Part of the challenge here is the perceived lower value of social media comments. Though a
full engagement of the topic requires a separate discussion, a brief comment is warranted.
The perception of social media speech openly contradicts the ideal of neutrality; a fiction
maintained in defamation law where formal ranking of publications has not been undertaken.
Courts have only written of different readerships in considering whether a comment is
defamatory.190 And yet, the public may unofficially rank publications in some manner (for
example by perceived quality). This behaviour would be consistent with the marketplace of
ideas concept that leaves to the individual reader such a choice.191 Rowbottom has provided
the language of high and low level speech.192 This categorization has brought the discussion
further along (notably as it combines the medium of speech with a notion of its value).193
With regards to speech by workers on social media, one factor to assist in establishing a
space for comments is to examine the author’s motive through assessment of the language
employed. Crisp offers a good scenario for consideration. There, the sounder basis for
upholding the dismissal can be broadly placed under the notion of fidelity or loyalty.194 The
claimant was at liberty to express opinions as he had but he must also have accepted the
employer’s response to those comments by dismissing him.195 The strict communications
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strategy as borne out in the worker’s employment contract emphasized the importance of
reputation. Even though Crisp did not hold a managerial level position,196 the tone of his
postings (especially if one considers that his first mention of the matter was on his Facebook
page) went beyond the measure of mere remarks as they undercut the company’s image (as a
reputable producer of electronics products). The motive was to impugn his employer and,
recalling the threshold of seriousness, it is suggested that such a motive be sufficient to pass
that standard. There is support for this as a demarcation point. The Leuven Labour Tribunal
took a similar path to that identified here.197 The critical statements of a business
development manager on his Facebook account constituted serious misconduct warranting
dismissal because of the company’s communications policy; his work as a manager; and
finally as a result of the timing of the comments which came about when the CEO had been
reassuring markets about the company’s strength. The European Court of Human Rights has
also found that where the intention of the worker was to damage the employer’s reputation,
the speech did not contribute to social debate.198
V. Conclusion
In contrast to Canada, speech of workers on social media platforms garners noticeably less
protection in the UK. The matter is made more stark by the disconnect between these
decisions and recent legislative and common law movement regarding UK defamation law.
The distance in protection of speech for workers versus media must be critically engaged. It
is a troubling distinction where the law protects a range of media from the tort of defamation
for writing about a range of matters viewed under the expansive rubric of a marketplace of
ideas when workers’ remarks may also fit under the same heading. There should be more
robust scope for a worker to offer a critique of her employer. As it stands, there appear to be
limitations not in concert with defamation law. Force may be detected in both instances
where the benefit for the public may be positive. The underlying difficulty is the
categorization of social media as a lower form of speech, thereby intimating that mainstream
media is at a higher level which is worthy of protection. This is a subject for another analysis.
For the present, social media inherently has the potential to challenge such a presumption.
There should be a better engagement of workers’ free speech on social media that balances
the right with the business interests of employing entities.
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